One of Foreign Policy's Best Five Books of 2013; chosen by Marc Lynch of The Middle East ChannelBeginning with the 2003 invasion of Iraq and concluding with the aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprisings; Frederic M. Wehrey investigates the roots of the Shi'a-Sunni divide now dominating the Persian Gulf's political landscape. Focusing on three Gulf states affected most by sectarian tensions―Bahrain; Saudi Arabia; and Kuwait―Wehrey identifies the factors that have exacerbated or tempered sectarianism; including domestic political institutions; the media; clerical establishments; and the contagion effect of external regional events; such as the Iraq war; the 2006 Lebanon conflict; the Arab uprisings; and Syria's civil war.In addition to his analysis; Wehrey builds a historical narrative of Shi'a activism in the Arab Gulf since 2003; linking regional events to the development of local Shi'a strategies and attitudes toward citizenship; political reform; and transnational identity. He finds that; while the Gulf Shi'a were inspired by their coreligionists in Iraq; Iran; and Lebanon; they ultimately pursued greater rights through a nonsectarian; nationalist approach. He also discovers that sectarianism in the region has largely been the product of the institutional weaknesses of Gulf states; leading to excessive alarm by entrenched Sunni elites and calculated attempts by regimes to discredit Shi'a political actors as proxies for Iran; Iraq; or Lebanese Hizballah. Wehrey conducts interviews with nearly every major Shi'a leader; opinion shaper; and activist in the Gulf Arab states; as well as prominent Sunni voices; and consults diverse Arabic-language sources.
#430133 in Books Richard K Betts 2011-12-06Original language:EnglishPDF # 1 9.02 x 1.00 x 5.98l; 1.38 #File Name: 0231151225384 pagesAmerican Force Dangers Delusions and Dilemmas in National Security
Review
1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. Great ReadBy Martin D Chance JrNow is as good a time as ever to become educated on the history of American intervention since the end of the Cold War as well as their successes and failures and how we should best intervene in the future so as to maximize our foreign policy goals and minimize the cost in blood and treasure.1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. In "American Force" Richard Betts Hits a Home RunBy Carl FordA thoughtful examination of the use of force in U.S. national security policy. His insights are helpful to both the expert and the casual reader. If you want to have a better understanding of America's role in the world; and the dangers we face in the future; this is must read.3 of 3 people found the following review helpful. Another fine book by Richard BettsBy David AhlstromI have used Richard Betts' work for my international business and international relations for global managers courses for a number of years. I found his Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments On Causes Of War And Peace (3rd edition; I believe) to be particularly helpful in quickly teaching students about conflicts of various kinds in the post-Cold War years. His new book; American Force: Dangers; Delusions; and Dilemmas in National Security; is also a helpful supplemental reader for various International Relations or 20th century history courses where conflict and strategizing are important. The book is well-written and well-argued. I did have some trouble with his conclusion in some of the chapters; but these would be helpful points of discussion in a course and do not detract at all from this fine book.Just to note one quick example; in chapter 10; the book asked if 'Strategy was an illusion.' I hear this a lot in studying a range of strategic plans and action; from security studies and diplomacy; to scenario planning in business; to business plans and positioning in management and entrepreneurship. Just because a 'plan' is not fully implemented; and just because you end up veering far from your original strategy; or otherwise 'got lucky' along the way (Professor Betts uses Churchill in WWII as an example) does not mean that strategy is not useful. This would be like saying a business plan is not useful because you end up not following it anyway after one year; or its financials are not valuable because you change things so much anyway and they must be almost totally revised. A strategy is a helpful reference point; whether you are a country or a company (or government agency). For instance; one of the strengths of Lincoln's management of the American Civil War was not that he somehow gave up on strategy (as implied toward the end of chapter 10); but that he was able to reorient the North's strategy; particularly consistent with the revised mission of the Civil War; which had changed considerably from the original 'restore the antebellum Union' objective (with a change to the accompanying 'limited war strategy' early in the War). The fast (relatively-speaking) movement by Grant in the East and the cutting off of increasingly more of the Confederacy in the West by various armies and the Union Navy most certainly constituted a strategy; albeit a lot different from what Lincoln started the war with. This chapter and its debates are helpful in developing a nice homework or class discussion around its interesting and well-argued points; which is one of the charactistics that makes this book quite valuable. In spite of these and some other quibbles; I found this book to be very well written and argued; and quite interesting. It will very useful for a variety of courses in international relations; security studies; history and even international business (where students need to deal with conflict; strategy; planning and so forth). Highly recommended to both university instructors and readers.
